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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
REAL EsrrATE EXCHANGE, 
A Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK ALLEN KINGSTON and 
DOROTHY KINGSTON, 
Defendants. 
STATEMENT OF F.&CTS 
The statement of facts set forth in the plaintiff's 
Brief iH substantially correct, except that it states that 
the <lef endants declined to offer testimony. This is not 
true. There was no reason for the defendants to intro-
duce the testimony either of themselves or of their wit-
nesses by reason o.f the fact that the Court granted a 
Summary Judgment at the conclusion of the Plaintiff's 
testimony. The testimony is accurate generally but is 
inaccurate in that it omits the crucial factual points upon 
which the Court predicated its Judgment. 
The purchase contract, which was the subject of the 
action, required the purchasers to make a payment of 
$375.00 on or before the 26th day of August, 1964, and 
$375.00 on the 26th day of each succeeding calendar 
month. It further provided a 30-day grace period, De-
fendant's Exhibit 1. The pre-trial order stipulated that 
the only payment received by the First Security Bank 
wa~ in tht· amount ot $-1--1-3.00 and \\'hieh was (·n•d1t1·d 111 
8eptember 28, 1964, Pretrial Order Crr. 71). The e:scru 11 
was therefore delinquent from U1(~ datt• of ib irn'('1>tir1n 
Plaintiff's agent \d10 con8mm1rnkd the <lPa\ 11 ;i, 
aware that monthly paynwnts of $375.00 were n•quired 
(Tr. 16-17). The property involved had a cafe, motel, 
trailer units, and also sold groceries and beer. (Tr. 26-2i) 
No effort was made by the plaintiff or plaintil'L 
agent to investigate the credit of the purchasPrs. (Tr. l.j: 
(Tr. 16) (Tr. 17) The plaintiff and his agent knew tlia: 
the only business experience that the purchaser ha<l 1,1 a., 
that he was some kind of a singer and was familiar witl1 
the surroundings which involved this purchase. (Tr. 2~1 
This was confirmed by the purchaser himself who tP8ti-
fied that he worked at Hill Field and at one time had 
worked in a service station for a period, and worked in 
a grocery store for a period, neither in a managerial 
capacity. (Tr. 61) The plaintiff was aware that ho.th the 
Malloys were employed and their combined income was 
approximately $10,000.00, but that one of them would 
have to quit employment to run the business (Tr. 28 i 
The plaintiff further realized that the only way that th1 
purchasers would make the payments was out of th1• 
profits of the business. (Tr. 19) Also, they realized that 
eve:n: 'though the sellers made a profit from the busines~ 
that did not prove the purchasers would make a similar 
profit (Tr. 21). However, the plaintiff was willing tn 
gamble that this would be done. (Tr. 22) 
The plaintiff's Brief indicates the plaintiff advised 
the defendants that they were working for both partie~ 
(Tr. 50), however, they did not tell the defendants that 
in the event the sale was consummated they expected 
2 
POl:\T I 
'l,HE COL:RT DID NU'r ERR IN lj,INDING 'l'HA'J' 
'rHE PLAIN'rIFF DID NO'r OB'I1AIN AN ABL:Bj ANJJ 
WILLING BUYER OF 'rHE PRDJMISE8 OF 'l11-IE 
DEFENDAKTS 
The facts and issues that have been stipulatPd Jw. 
tween the parties are as follows: The plaintiff and drfon 
dants entered into a contract wherein the plaintiff 1('(1s 
hired by the defendants as n real estate agent fl) sell 
certain real property situated in Morgan County, Ftul1. 
The final tf•rms of the contract were differpnt from th1' 
listing conditions, and an escrow was set up at the Firnt 
Security Bank of Ogden, Utah. All of the papers involved 
in this transaction were prepared by the plaintiff. Tlw 
purchaser was required to make the first installment pay. 
ment on the 26th day of August, 1964, although the 
purchase contract provided for a 30-day grace period. 
One payment was made; this was received by the 
escrow agent September 28th, 1964, at a time when th1' 
escrow agreement was in default. No. other payment was 
made and the escrow was terminated and the papers re-
turned to the defendants on the 4th day of Decembrr, 
1964. At no time during the existence of the escrow agree-
ment were the provisions of the purchase contract com-
plied with by the purchasers. 
It is well recognized and established law that before a 
real estate broker can obtain a commission he must pro-
duce a buyer who is ready, willing and able to complete 
the transaction. 
12 American Jurisprudence 2d, Brokers, Section 183, 
provides as follows : 
4 
f!rocitring per~on rnady, able, and willing to per-
(orm. As a general rule, under th~ ordinary under-
taking of a broker, the broker is not entitled to 
the compensation called for by his contract of 
employment until he produces a person who is 
ready, able, and willing both to accept and live up 
to the terms offered by his principal. On the other 
hand, and in the absence of any stipulation to the 
contrary in the contract of employment, the brok-
er is entitled to his commissions when he produces 
such a person, notwithstanding that his employer 
refuses to transact business with the person in 
question. 
12 American Jurisprudence 2d, Brokers, Sootion 184, 
provides as follows : 
What constitutes ability to perform. The cases 
passing upon what constitutes abilty to perform 
on the part of a proposed purchaser involve a 
variety of circumstances, but it is clear in general 
that the proposed purchaser must have the legal 
capacity to purchase, in addition to having suffi-
cient financial ability not only to make the initial 
payment required to meet the terms of the seller, 
but also to complete the contract of purchase ac-
cording to its terms - that is, to meet any de-
ferred payments. 
Utah has rooognized this Rule for many years last 
past. 
The same rule is found in Corpus Juris Secwndum, 
12. Brokers, Section 85, which provides as follows: 
Each of the words "ready", "willing", and "able" 
5 
t•_\jll'Pss1·s an i.l1•a tl1at tl1t· 11ll1i·r:-; do Hilt e<1m·,.,, 
All thret• of tht>s1· 1•lt•11wnts must t'Xi::;t in thP ,. 11 ~ 
tomer, in or<ll·r to Pntitle tlH· lirnkt·r to l1i:-; coJ 11 
missions. lt is not :mfficient that the custorne1 
is ready and willing, hut he must also have t]1p 
ability to carry out the loan, salP, purchase, or 
exchange; neither is it sufficient that he has the 
ability to purchase; he must be ready and willin~ 
to do so; nor is it suffi<'ient that he is ablP, rr>ady, 
and willing, but on terms differpnt from tliost 
prescribed by the owner. 
Where they have not been in controversy bt•tween 
the vendor and purchaser, matters relating to tht 
furnishing or showing of an abstract of title an 
unimportant. 
Tests of ability. Although the inability of a cu~­
tomer may arise from legal incapacity, from lact 
of title, in the case of an exchange, from encum 
brances, in the case of a seller, or from lack ol 
assent of his wife, where such assent is requirea 
by contract, ordinarily the word "able" is used ii 
connection with a purchaser or lessee, refers fo 
his financial ability. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has habitually and con 
sistently recognized the rule theretofore set forth in tb~ 
following cases: Fritsch v Hess, Utah, 162 P. 70, 41 
Utah 75; E. B. Wicks Co. v. Moyle, 137 P2d 342, lff 
Utah 554; Lewis v. Dahl, 161 P2d 362, 168 Utah 48t 
Hoyt v Wasatch Homes, Inc. 261 P2d 927, 1 Utah (2) ~ 
Curtis v Mortensen, 267 P. 2d, 237, 239, 1 Utah 2d 35; 
and F.M.A. Financial Fund v Build, inc., 404 P2, 6711 
17 Utah 2d 80. 
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'J1lw trial Court Found: 
In an alrno::;t identical case in Oregon, the Trial 
Court found that the purchasers were not ready, willing 
ur ahle beeam;e they had neither the experience, know-
Jed•q: or fiHancial ability to purchase. The Supreme 
( 'o~rt Con rt sm;tained the verdict in Martin v Clinton, 
398 P2d 7 42, saying: 
Plaintiff must show that the proposed purchasers 
had the ability not only to make the down pay-
ment but the installment payments as well. There 
was evidence from which the trial court could 
have reasonably concluded that the prospective 
purchasers would not be able to make the install-
J iH::n i payments out of the operation of the res-
taurant and there was also reason to believe that 
if tl1e purchasers eould not make the payments 
from that source they might not be able to borrow 
money to meet the installments. 
It is difficult to find a case mC>re similar on the 
facts and the law here as in the Oregon case. The trial 
Court and the evidence clearly demonstrates that the pur-
chaser did not have the experience or knowledge to oper-
ate the property subsequent, and certainly lacked the 
financial ability to purchase on the terms as set forth. 
The state of Kansas has reached a similar decision 
in H iniger v Judy, 398 P2d 305. In that case the real 
&State broker sued to recover for the sale of a farm. The 
trial Court gave judgment fC>r the plaintiff and the de-
fendant appealed. The Supreme Court reversed saying 
that there was no competent evidence to sustain a find-
ing of the part of the broker. 
The general rule is that a real estate broker is 
entitled to a commission if (a) he produces a 
buyer who is able, ready and willing to purchase 
upon the proffered terms C>r upon term accept-
able to the principal; (b) he is the efficient and 
procuring cause of a consummated deal. The 
broker can recover a commission only if he sus-
7 
tains the burden of proving that he has fulfil! 1.r[ 
each of these conditions. 
Thus, it is the established law that the burden of 
proving affirmatively that a purchaser is in fart readi 
•' 
willing and able to make the purchase rests upon th~ 
plaintiff in this case. The plaintiff is bound by the r~­
sults of his own testimony, and his testimony prowi 
conclusively that although the purchaser that he ac 
quired may in fact have been willing, he was neither l'<•ad! 
or able to make the transaction. The admitted evidemt 
indicated that the purchaser did not have the abilitv to 
meet the contract payments and that he failed to do so 
although they lost the real property they had tr an sf erred 
in lieu of a down payment. It is submitted upon the ad-
mitted facts that the plaintiff has a duty to affirmatively 
prove the financial ability of the purchaser to pay the 
installment contract. It alleged no facts at pretrial that 
in any way contradicted the stipulated and agreed facts, 
which shows conclusively an admitted financial inability 
to perform nor did it produce proof at trial. 
The only cases that plaintiff cites is a long line oi 
California cases, which provides that an executed con· 
tract conclusively presumes that a purchaser is ready, 
willing and able. In so holding California has deviated 
from the rule laid down by almost every other jurisdic· 
tion in the United States. The Utah cases have nowhere 
in any of the discussions contained therein adopted this 
minority view nor have they at any time indicated an: 
presumption conclusively or otherwise with regards to 
this matter. 
Counsel states that F.M . .A. FiMJneial Fund v Buikl, 
Inc., 404 P2d 670,17 Utah 2d 80, is exactly in point 
8 
:\ 11 l'Xarnination indicates that the only real similarity 
fJl't" een that case and the case at Bar is that there was 
a purchase contract and that the purchaser sued for 
i'('t·wission. !<~.M.A. Financial Fund v Build, Inc., the pur-
r·liaser, was succ..essful in rescinding the contract. '11he re-
i'Ofd does not show that the purchaser at the time of 
rxecution was not ready, willing and able to consummate 
the deal. rrhe records do not indicate in any manner 
that the purchaser lacked either the 'ability to pay or 
the knowledge to successfully operate the property to be 
purchased. It does not show that the realtor knew of these 
defects or that the realtor was a double agent. The record 
is devoid of any testimony that the purchasers defaulted. 
In the case at Bar, however, the suit for rescission, was not 
~nccf>ssful. The purchaser renounced any claim in or to 
the prorwrty or for any rescission or for any other right 
for the nuisance sum of $300.00, all of which he paid to 
his attorney. On the other hand this record demonstrates 
conclusively the complete inability of the purcha.Ser to 
perform. 
On this record, Furnd v Build, Inc., supra is not 1n 
point and not applicable. The ruling of the trial court 
was correct. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ElRR IN FINDING THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS AN UNDISCLOSED AGEN'T 
FOR FEE FOR BOTH THE BUYERS AND SE.LLERS 
IN SAID SUBJECT TRANSACTION. 
The plaintiff again takes exception in his Brief to 
the fact that the only evidence comes from the plaintiff. 
He ignores the fact that upon the granting of a motion 
9 
for 8nnnnary .Jndgli1Pnt at th<' (•OJH·lttsion of pla nti1 1 
easP that the defendants art> not rt-quested, expectrd 1, 
required to produce testimony. Again the plaintiff quotr 
at length in his Brief in an attempt hy eompletely ig-nu: 
ing the nub of the situation, mainly, that both partiP~ \Ht 
at no time advised of the intent that the plaintiff wa, 
going to collect a commission from hoth partiPs. 01t t\ 11 
contrary, the plaintiff's testimony, which binds th~u1• 
is that it did not so advise the defendants or eithPr 11: 
them, because it was none of their business. It cornvleleh 
ignores the fact that that Mrs. Kingston's husband, an: 
co-owner of the property, was in Florida and that tht! 
never at any time discussed any such arrangement· 
with him and that his sole knowledge of the tran~ 
action was contained in the papers that were sent ti 
him by the plaintiff. 
Further, the plaintiff completely neglects or ignun· 
setting forth any law to confirm his position. The 
reason for that is there isn't any. The rule is set down i1 
12 American Jurisprudence 2d, Section 172. 
Effect of knowledge, consent or custom. The gen 
eral rule that an agent of one o.f the parties !11 
a sale or exchange of property may legally cnn 
tract for compensation with the other party t1 
the transaction with the knowledge or consent o: 
his principal applies to brokers. Except in a fe1 
cases wherein it has heen held that in order !1 
entitle a broker to commission from both th1 
buyer and seller there must be an express coi 
tract by which the buyer and seller bind thern 
selves to pay, the rule is that of both parties !1 
a transaction have knowledge that the broker ii 
10 
acting for tlwm both, and do Hot ohjt>ct, hut allow 
him to so act and agree to pay him compensation, 
thPy will be held to have assented to his acting 
in a double capacity, provided he hai:; not fraud-
ulently favored one at the expense of the other. 
rl'he Utah Courts have fully recognized the above 
rule and havP followed the same for many years. In Van 
Lcl'uwen v Ihtffaker, 5 P.(2) 714, 78 Utah 521 the Court 
harl occasion to discuss this precise problem: 
The general rule is that a real estate broker em-
ployed to sell, purchase, or exchange property 
for a specified commission, who, in effecting the 
transaction, also reeceives a commission from the 
other party, without disclosing that fact to his 
principal, is not entitled to recover a commission 
from his principal, especially where there is evi-
dence that reliance was placed upon his judgment 
and skill. McLure v Luke, 84 C.C.A. 1, 154 F. 
647, 650, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 659, and note; 9 C.J. 
568. 
and again the Court held further : 
The rule is based upon the doctrine that the duty 
of an agent for a vendor is to sell the property at 
the highest price; and of the agent of the pur-
chaser, to buy it for the lowest. Farnsworth v. 
Hemmer, 1 Allen (Mass.) 494, 79 Am. Dec. 756. 
When the fact of such inconsistent relation is 
either admitted or proved, the burden is then upon 
the agent to show that both principals had know-
ledge and consented to his acting in such dual 
capacity, and without such proof he is not en-
titled to recover compensation from either. 
11 
'l'his doctrine was re-affirmed as late as January, rn11, 
by the Supreme Court in lVilkcrson v 8tcn~11s, 1 ;j i''La 
2d 173, 397 P2d 983. Thus, it will be seen that not onh 
did the plaintiff admit that the true extent of ihi du~! 
relationship was never disclosed to the defendants but 
on the contrary, the extent of that relationship was ex 
pressly denied and hidden from the defendants. TJi, 
plaintiff could not claim that it did what it concedes it 
did not do. The claim of the plaintiff for commissioi 
from either party is rendered uncollectable by publir 
policy. The defendants could not agree to conditions 01 
an agency when they did not know the extent of that 
agency. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 'l'HM 
PLAINTIFF HAD AGREED rro ACCEPT P AYME~'l 
OF THE COMMISSION ourr OF THE MONTHLY 
PAYMENTS MADE: IN ACCORDANCE TO THE 
ES.CROW AGREEMENT AND THAT THE PUR-
CHASERS MADE NO PAYMENT ON SAID CON-
TRACT EXCEPT AS HEREINBEFORE SET 
FORTH. 
It is quite correct that the defendants signed an 
exclusive sales. agency contract with the plaintiff on 
or about F e b r u a r y 15, 1964, however, the plain 
tiff admitted that no purchaser of any kind was obtained 
by it in conformity with the listing contract. Thereafter! 
in July, 1964, an earnest money receipt and off er to pur· 
chase was tendered by the ultimate purchasers. It w11.1 
never executed, however, by the defendant Mark Kin~­
ton and that proposal fell through because of the inability 
of the proposed purchasers to obtain the down payment, 
which was a part of their offer. Thereafter, the August 
12 
ap:rt•(•111ent was entered into upon terms substantially 
diffrrent from that in the listing agreement. As the 
plaintiff conceded there was no cash involved in the 
transaction, it was fully aware that the defendants had 
no money with which to pay any fee, so it offered 
tlrn agreement and by including in all of the escrow docu-
ments a provision whereby the plaintiff would accept its 
11ommission out of sales received from the buyers. It is 
conceded that the plaintiff did not thereupon excute a 
nrw eon tract with the defendants, however, it was aware 
of the> fact that no deal could be made without th:s pro-
vision in it, and it so wrote all of the documents. The 
completed deal, including the provisions for the payment 
of any commissions without all monies received from 
the purchasers, was then sent to the defendant Mark 
Kingston in Florida and he executed the same. 
It is significant to note that at no time did t4e plain-
tiff make any claims that it intended or desired to hold 
the defendants to any other agreement. On the contrary, 
the plaintiff prepared the agreement to sell with that 
provision in it and remained mute. The plaintiff cannot 
now repudiate its own acts and its own deeds and, 
because of the default of the purchasers, nullify what 
it knew to be an intricate part of Jhe contract where-
by the defendants agreed to sell. The Supreme Court of 
Utah in Mifflin v. Shiki, 293 Pl, 77 Utah 190 had before 
it this precise problem, and the Court in finding against 
the Broker stated: 
The listing agreement was prepared by the plain-
tiff, on a printed form furnished by him. He testi-
fied that all the writing placed in the blanks was 
written by him. In interpreting the contract, there-
13 
fore, it must bt> constnwd most strongly agaill: 
him. 13 C.P. 545. 
It has long been recognized that a brokerage contrat 
may provide for the payment of fees on special conili 
tion. Thus, in 12 Am J ur 2d, Section 195 the rule is statei, 
as follows: 
Effect of special brokerage .(J;greements of co 11. 
ditiovns. Although in the conventional brokagf 
transaction the broker does not assume the risk oi 
non pref ormance by the parties to the transactiori 
negotiated by the broker, the broker and his prin 
cipal may vary this rule to any extent by makin1 
payment of the commission dependent upon w 
tain conditions or contingencies, such as a conru. 
tion that payment of commissions is to depena 
upon complete performance, consummation of the 
transaction, transfer of title, payment of the pur. 
chase price, or the like. When such stipulatiom 
are made, a fulfilment or performance of the pre 
scribed conditions is generally essential to !ht 
right to compensation. 
One of the special agreements or conditions upon 
which the fee can be made contingent is the provision 
calling for a payment out of the purchase price, or out ol 
the installments made on the purchase price as was madr 
herein. 12 Am J ur 2d, Section 196 states: 
The broker's right to commission, under an agree-
ment making such commission payable out of th~ 
purchase price, is, generally speaking, clear where 
the sale is completed and the purchase price paia. 
The cases have differed, however, as to whether 
the broker may be entitled to a commission where 
14 
1 IH· :-::tip i:-: not ('Onsmnmatt>d. Souw of the cas<'S 
lian' hPld or n~eognized that where a brokerage 
eontract provides for payment of the commission 
f rorn, or out of, the purchase price, the broker 
is not entitled to commissions where either the 
purchaser or the owner defaults. 
rrhis rule again has been the rule in Utah since 1921. 
In Watson v. Odell, 198 P. 772, 58 Utah 276, the Court 
has hefore it a contest between the broker and the sel-
lH for a coinmission, having therein a provision for 
the naYment of a commission out of installments. rrhe , . 
Court found that because the installments were not paid 
there was no obligation on the part of the seller. 
The fact that a sale for a definite amount of money 
is mentioned in the agreements of l\Ia:rch 7th and 
May 10th indicates that no such cumbersome, con-
ditional, and unenforceable contract as that of May 
20th was in contemplation of the individual defend-
ants when they signed the agreement of May 10, 
1916. A sale is ordinarily understood to mean a 
transfer of property for money. Pope, Legal Defi-
nitions, 1437. Ultimately the contract of May 10th, 
if successfully consummated, would eventuate in 
the :,receipt 1of money by the stockholders, but 
nevertheless it is fanciful and far-fetched to speak 
o.f the agreement as a sale. Assuming that plaintiff 
was employed by the individual defendants by the 
contract of May 10th, that, nevertheless, was not a 
general employment. Both by the contract of 
March 7th and the correlated agreement of May 
10th his employment was special, on definite, spe-
cial terms-a definite sale price of $260,000; a 
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<lefinitt> eommission of $30,000 payable pro rat 
as the purchase price would be paid. No comn1i1 
sion was payable except in the event of the cun 
summation of a sale, and no commission was pay 
able except as the purchase price was paid. The;1 
contracts required more from the plaintiff thar
1 
merely to find purchasers able, willing, and read1 
to buy. The actual payment of the purchase prit1 
was required, and only as the purchase price wa, 
paid were the commission installments due ani! 
payable. 
This decision was reiterated in Mifflin v. Shiki 
supra. The most recent decision is that of Prince George', 
Country Club, Inc., v. Edward R. Carr, Inc. MD. 202 A21i 
354. Here there was a proposed sale of $1,300,000.00 ct 
the assets of the corporation, which were substantially a~ 
of the assets. The plaintiff sued for a broker's commi1 
sion. T.he Court found that the Vendor had agreed to pa: 
the commission out of the proceeds made from the profit· 
of the sale and that this was a condition precedent to thi 
earning of a fee by the plaintiff. 
The rule underlying the statute does not apply be-
cause the contract which the broker signed madP 
the consummation of the sale a condition precedent 
to the earning of the broker's commissions. Borow· 
ski v. Meyers, 195 Md. 226, 232-233, 72 A.2d 70li 
704, after reiterating the usual rule, held: 
'On the other hand, a broker is not entitled !Q 
commission if he has not completed the under 
taking which he assumed. The essence of s 
brokerage commission is that it is dependent 
upon success, and that it is not dependent in 
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any way upon the amount of work done by the 
broker. • • • 
'80, where consummation of 1::. sale is depend-
ent upon a condition, the principal's agree-
ment to pay a commission to the broker is de-
pendent upon the stipulated contingency; and 
if the broker acquiesces in the arrangement, 
and reasonable and bona fide efforts are 
made by the principal to perform the condi-
tion, but the efforts are unsuccessful, the 
broker is not entitled to a cmnmis~oirJn.' 
The Court further concluded: 
In the present case we think a condition precedent 
was intended. The Club and the h::oker agreed 
in terms that the provision as to commissions was 
to constitute a condition. The condition was not 
only that the commission was to be paid at the 
time of settlement but that it was to be paid from 
the $700,000 part of the purchase price, and the 
necessary inference, we find, is that if there was 
no such purchase price there was to be no com-
m1ss10n. 
See also: Tant v. Gee, 348 Mo. 633, 154 8.W. 2d 745; 
(!olvin v. Post Mortgage .and Land Company, 225 N.Y. 
510, 122 N.E. 454. 
The jurisdiction that the plaintiff relies upon to bail 
him out on the first point, dynamites him on this point. In 
Cardoza v. Moorehouse, 17 Cal. Rptr. 28, the Broker had 
sut>d for his commission. The defendant claimed a modi-
fieation of the agreement, however, the Court found that 
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COXCL1'SIOX 
l n tl1i:-: appeal the trial court found three reasons to 
1
,[.-t11'_1 tlw granting of a Smnrnary Judgment against the 
i'la· 11tiff and in favor of the defendants. All of these rea-
,,111~ ,n_•n· conclusively supported by the evidence and 
j, 1 tlic· Im,·, although it would only be necessary 
ti1 i ind ow•, a :-:ufficient justification to uphold the trial 
,.1,urt"s decision. 
Thi· plaintiff herein sought to take advantage of the 
;un:idY of the defendant wife and the absence of the de-
i1·ndant husband to consummate a contract and earn a 
, u1n111i:-:sion. Having failed to convince the trial court 
(1f 1 Jw l<>gality of its desires to escape the consequences 
(if its acts, it now requests this court to ignore the ulti-
111ate and material facts involved and award to it a new 
trial for commissions that it never earned. It would have 
tlii:.: Court do what the Supreme Court of Kansas r~ 
fused to do, to-wit: Ignore the admissions which the 
plaintiff and its agents made, contrary to their interest. 
It is submitted that justice and the law requires the up-
linlding of a trial Court's decision. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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